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As an emerging technology, the potential deployment of connected and automated vehicles 
(CAVs) in cities is attributed with significant uncertainties and anticipated consequences 
requiring responsible governance of innovation processes. Despite a growing number of studies 
on policies and governance arrangements for managing the introduction of CAVs, there is a 
gap in understanding about country-specific governance strategies and approaches. This 
research aims to contribute addressing this gap by presenting a comparative analysis of CAV-
related policy documents in Finland, UK, and Germany, three countries which are actively 
seeking to promote the introduction of CAVs and which have distinct administrative traditions. 
Our analytical framework is based on the set of premises about technology as a complex socio-
technical phenomenon, operationalized using governance cultures and sociotechnical 
imaginaries concepts. Our comparative policy document analysis focuses on the assumed roles 
for CAV technology, the identified domains and mechanisms of governance, and the assumed 
actors responsible for steering the development process. The results highlight similarities in 
pro-automation values across three different countries, while also uncovering important 
differences outside the domain of traditional transport policy instruments. In addition, the 
results identify different types of potential technological determinism, which could restrict 
opportunities for responsiveness and divergent visions of mobility futures in Europe. 
Concluding with a warning against further depolitization of technological development and a 
dominant focus on economic growth, we identify several necessary directions for further 
developing governance and experimentation processes. 
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The landscape of urban mobility technologies is currently experiencing a period of significant 
change, with multiple emerging mobility technologies, which are by definition imbued with 
such features as uncertainty, prominent impact, and fast development (Rotolo et al., 2015). 
Focusing particularly on connected and automated vehicles (CAVs), there is a growing body 
of literature reflecting on the governance and policy implications in relation to multiple 
anticipated consequences (Blyth et al., 2016; Cohen and Cavoli 2019; Fagnant and Kockelman, 
2015; Faisal et al., 2019; Fraedrich et al. 2019; Guerra, 2016; Hopkins and Schwanen, 2018; 
Legacy et al. 2019; Milakis et al., 2017; Porter et al., 2018; Stilgoe, 2018; Thomopoulos and 
Givoni, 2015). Starting from the fundamental governance rationales of efficiency, equity and 
ethics (Howlett, 2009; Lyons, 2018; Winfield and Jirotka, 2018), we observe that the domain 
of emerging mobility technologies such as CAVs faces a classic Collingridge double-bind 
dilemma (Collingridge, 1980). This dilemma contrasts the early stage of development, when 
change is easy but there is uncertainty about consequences, with the later stages of 
technological maturity, associated with a lock-in when the technology has become societally 
embedded (Collingridge, 1980; Genus and Stirling, 2018). This dilemma is at the core of 
challenges for steering development of an emerging technology, highlighting the need for 
governing responsible innovation processes that would avoid different types of technological 
determinism (Wyatt, 2008). 
 
Whilst reflection about undesired consequences and responsible innovation is ongoing, there 
remains a gap in country-specific analysis of governance strategies (Milakis, 2019; Taeihagh 
and Lim, 2019). Addressing such gap is important for devising common and specific 
governance strategies across Europe, involving hybrid multi-actor networks. This research 
addresses this gap by comparatively reviewing national level CAV governance document for 
a set of three European countries: Finland, Germany and the UK. These countries have been 
selected as they are among the global leaders in CAV technology development and are actively 
developing related governance strategies. Moreover, each country represents a distinct 
administrative tradition of western democracy, namely Nordic, Rhinelandic, and ’British Isles’ 
(Loughlin et al, 2011), providing a useful dimension by which to compare and contrast. For 
achieving the above end, we form a novel framework for the analysis of technological 
innovation governance. The much-utilized Multi-Level Governance perspective often 
overlooks spatial variables (Pangbourne, 2010), and is more concerned with articulations 
between scale on the one hand, and the interplay of and the distribution of powers. 
Contrastingly, we draw theoretical constructs from both governance and technology studies to 
uncover additional political, cultural, historical and geographical factors, and consider their 
implications.  
 
The manuscript is divided into six sections. In Section 2, we set out our analytical framework, 
which synthesizes concepts of governance cultures and sociotechnical imaginaries, forming a 
technology-governance-culture triad. We then list three research questions and describe how 
we apply this framework to our analysis of public documents on CAVs from our three case 
studies. In Sections 3, 4 and 5, we present an analysis of our three research questions relating 
to the assumed societal roles for CAVs, the identified domains and mechanisms of governance 
of CAV deployment, and the assumed actants responsible for steering the development process. 
Section 6 concludes with a summary of analysis, discussion of potential for technological 
determinism, and a set of recommendations for further research through establishing 




2.1. Analytical framework  
In order to develop our analytical framework, we first establish our understanding of CAV 
technology as a complex socio-technical phenomenon (e.g., Mladenović, 2018; Mladenović, 
2019). As a central premise of this perspective, technologies are understood not just as 
utilitarian artefacts, but also as underpinned and shaped by dynamic interactions with human 
values and norms (Feenberg, 1999; Kroes and Verbeek, 2014, Kudina, 2019; Mladenović et 
al., 2019; Veerbek, 2011). In fact, technologies mediate human activities and experiences, co-
constructing decisions and moral standpoints. Understanding that we cannot treat technologies 
as merely objects and humans as subjects interacting with them has important implications for 
moral agency, as a hybrid affair of networked human beings and acting, networked, artefacts. 
In this way, we proceed by terming both humans and technologies as actants (Latour, 1992; 
1996). Rather than the more mundane term actor, which is reserved for humans and their 
organizations in this research, actant is a term used to overcome human-only connotations for 
action in technological innovation processes. Another important premise is that emerging 
technology has interpretative flexibility, where functioning of technology is the result and not 
the cause of it becoming a successful and acceptable artefact, often assessed through the lens 
of particular social groups (Pinch and Bijker, 1984).  
 
Having grounded our analytical perspective on the understanding of emerging technology as a 
complex social-technical phenomenon, we identify two key concepts necessary for our 
analysis. First concept are sociotechnical imaginaries, as ‘imagined forms of social life and 
social order reflected in the design and fulfilment of nation-specific scientific and/or 
technological projects.’ (Jasanoff, 2004; Jasanoff and Kim, 2015). This concept lies beneath 
intertwined processes of (national) identity construction and visions of technological 
innovation (Ryghaug and Toftaker, 2016). Such visions often include co-construction of hopes 
and fears among specific institutions and actors that exist in the midst of processes of 
technological emergence (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008; Sturken et al., 2004). Clearly, 
sociotechnical imaginaries of one country will differ from that of another, due to the differences 
in cultural context in which they are embedded. Therefore, we can use this concept to inform 
our understanding of the institutionalized practices for testing and deploying knowledge claims 
in a society. Many knowledge claims are made about emerging technologies such as CAVs, 
which are highly complex innovations involving many different fields of knowledge and 
innovation. Such knowledge claims are associated with the ways in which the members of the 
given society imagine any given technology and its relationship to the social order. Thus, 
sociotechnical imaginaries will be used as one of the lenses for interpretation and comparison.  
 
The second key concept for developing the analytical framework is that of governance culture, 
which underlines cultural meanings and values in relation to acceptable purposes and 
appropriate mechanisms of governance practices (Paulsson et al., 2017; Rogge and Reichardt, 
2016; Stead, 2018). Here, we perceive that the governance of emerging technologies often 
faces an institutional void intertwined with distributed responsibility in hybrid networks of 
relevant institutions (Sclove, 1995; Wetmore, 2004). Following the ongoing discussion in the 
domain of technology ethics related to the responsibility gap for actions of learning automata, 
we recognize that responsibilities are formed during, often unstructured, negotiations between 
different groups of actants, such as designers, legislators, and users (Felt et al., 2017; Noorman, 
2014; Schulzke, 2013; van de Poel, 2011). Furthermore, with the initial premise that CAV 
technology is a complex artefact, we recognize a potentially wider web of governance actants, 
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beyond the human ones. In fact, technological development can be referred to as a ‘problem of 
many hands’, where governments, transnational tech companies, individuals, and even 
technological devices themselves influence the redistribution of power and morality (Susskind, 
2018; Winner, 1980). Therefore, our analytic framework has to provide a means of interpreting 
the wider cultural context in which these institutions are embedded, rather than solely focusing 
on the structure of institutional arrangements (Marsden and Reardon, 2017; Voß and Freeman, 
2016). Rather than reducing governance analysis to describing sets of bureaucratic institutions, 
the governance culture lens enables us to include a range of organizational mechanisms, 
operational assumptions, modes of thought, and consequential activities.  
 
Combining the above concepts into a technology-culture-governance triad enables a deeper 
understanding of how emerging technologies are being framed, assessed and responded to in 
different national contexts. By synthesizing the concepts of governance cultures and 
sociotechnical imaginaries into a single framework, we are better able to analyze the discursive 
meanings of technology found in governance documents by setting them alongside broader 
(national) cultural assumptions. Thus, in addition to deepening the concept of emerging 
technology, we acknowledge rhetorical functions of governance (Mladenović, 2019; 
Pangbourne et al 2020). Rhetoric is an important mechanism in the social construction of 
technology and challenges that technologies are supposed to address (Berkhout, 2006), and 
thus is crucial in the development of sociotechnical imaginaries. 
 
2.2. Research questions and policy documents reviewed 
In order to reveal the cultural interpretations of CAVs in Finnish, UK and German policies we 
ask three questions which are considered in turn in the next three sections of this manuscript: 
1. What are the assumed roles of CAV technology and its development process? 
2. What are the identified domains and mechanisms of governance in relation to 
anticipated challenges and risks in CAV technological development process?  
3. Who are the assumed actants responsible for the CAV technological development 
process?  
 
Each of these questions is addressed through reviewing policy documents. Our data consists of 
a selection of national documents concerning transport and technological development policies 
in Finland, Germany and the UK. Several types of documents are reviewed, including 
strategies, policy statements, and governmental webpages. These span a period of seven years, 
from 2013 to 2019, in order to try to identify the dominant discourse and governance culture 
that are embodied in the policy documents. A full list of the documents we sourced and 
examined is presented across Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 (for Finland, UK and Germany 
respectively). In line with our analytical framework, we review these documents as political 
artefacts produced in a particular cultural context, which represent the stabilized agreements of 
negotiations among often-heterogeneous groups of people and organizations (Jasanoff and 
Kim, 2015). The analysis focuses on (a) explicit goals as expressions of sociotechnical 










Table 1: Documents relevant to technological visions for transport in Finland and produced by governance 
actors, in chronological order of publication (Accessed by the authors via source websites) 
 
Year Title Source 
2013 Towards a new transport policy: Intelligence in Transport 
and Wisdom in Mobility 
Finnish Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
2014 Fair and Intelligent Transport Finnish Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
2014 100 opportunities for Finland and the world: Radical 
Technology Inquirer (RTI) for anticipation/evaluation of 
technological breakthroughs 
Committee for the Future, 
Parliament of Finland  
2014 Innovation policy options for sustainability transitions in 
Finnish transport 
Finnish Funding Agency for 
Technology and Innovation 
2015 A Nordic Model for Human-centered Personal Data 
Management and Processing 
Finnish Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
2017 Road Traffic Act Finnish Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
2017 Finland’s Age of Artificial Intelligence Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment 
2018 Act on Transport Service  Finnish Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
2018 Societal transformation 2018-2037: 100 anticipated radical 
technologies, 20 regimes, case Finland 
Committee for the Future, 
Parliament of Finland 
2018 Work in the age of artificial intelligence Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment 
2019 The impact of automated transport on the role, operations and 
costs of road operators and authorities in Finland 




Table 2: Documents relevant to technological visions for transport in the United Kingdom and produced 
by governance actors, in chronological order of publication (Accessed by the authors via source websites) 
 
Year Title Source 
2015 The pathway to driverless cars: A code of practice for testing Department for Transport 
2016 Pathway to driverless cars: Proposals to support advanced driver 
assistance systems and automated vehicle technologies 
The Department for Transport; 
Centre for Connected and 
Autonomous Vehicles 
2016 Funding competition: connected and autonomous vehicles 2 Department for Business, Energy 
& Industrial Strategy 
2017 Vehicle technology and aviation bill UK Parliament 
2017 New measures set out autonomous vehicle insurance and 
electric vehicle infrastructure 
Centre for Connected and 
Autonomous Vehicles; Centre for 
Protection of National 
Infrastructure; Department for 
Transport 
2017 The key principles of vehicle cyber security for connected and 
automated vehicles 
Department for Transport 
2017 UK Testing Ecosystem for Connected and Autonomous 
Vehicles 
Centre for Connected and 
Autonomous Vehicles 
2017 Industrial strategy: The grand challenges Department for Business, Energy 
& Industrial Strategy 
2018 Automated and Electric Vehicles Act UK Parliament 
2018 The fundamental principles of automotive cyber security - 
Specification 
Department for Transport; Centre 
for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure 




Table 3: Documents relevant to technological visions for transport in Germany and produced by 
governance actors, in chronological order of publication (Accessed by the authors via source websites) 
 
Year Title Source 
2015 Strategy for Automated and Connected Driving Federal Ministry of Transport and 
Digital Infrastructure 
2017 Road Traffic Act Federal Ministry of Justice and 
Consumer Protection 
2017 Report of the Ethics Commission on Automated and Connected 
Driving 
Federal Ministry of Transport and 
Digital Infrastructure 
2017 Data protection law recommendations of the Federal 
Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information 
for Automated and Connected Driving 
Federal Ministry of Transport and 
Digital Infrastructure 
2018 Report on the Implementation of the Automated and Connected 
Driving Strategy 
Federal Ministry of Transport and 
Digital Infrastructure 
2018 National Platform "Future of Mobility" Federal Ministry of Transport and 
Digital Infrastructure; Federal 
Ministry of Economy 
 
3. Analysis: What are the presumed roles of CAV technology in the 
society? 
In analyzing the socio-technical imaginaries for the role of CAV technology in society, we 
identified a set of common visions across all the three case countries, as well as some 
differences in focus and terminology. Across all the three countries, it is evident that CAVs are 
considered important for addressing significant national and global challenges around transport 
system efficiency, traffic safety, energy demand and sources in transport, and carbon neutrality. 
However, we found evidence that the societal role for CAV technology is not just imagined in 
relation to the transport system needs, but is shaped also by other assumptions about social 
needs and economic opportunities, as highlighted before by (Stilgoe, 2018). 
 
Indeed, the central assumption present in all three countries is that innovation in the domain of 
CAV technology should contribute to the national economic growth, which is often equated 
with national identity characteristics such as prosperity and sense of pride. The arguments 
about economic growth also tend to be framed in some similar ways across Finland, the UK 
and Germany, as necessary responses to social imperatives. For example, the theme of the 
aging population is discursively related to challenging national demographic dependency ratio, 
directly related to the problems in economic productivity. It is also common for governance 
documents in all three countries to associate explicitly economic growth with competitiveness 
in the global labor and product market, not only between firms but also between nation-states 
and regional blocks. Thus, governance imaginations center on narrating a global role for the 
specific nation in leading some aspect of the technological development of CAVs. We present 
examples over the next few paragraphs. 
 
In Finland, the vision of economic development through technological innovation is shaped by 
long-term transition to knowledge economy and carving out a niche for specialization among 
large actors outside of EU, such as US or China. Thus, economic growth is portrayed as 
essential for national survival. In addition to challenges similar to UK and Germany (see 
below), Finnish documents mention several other challenges, such as lack of raw materials and 
dependence on foreign energy resources, late and underutilized urbanization hand in hand with 
the loss of rural livelihood, and the need for large infrastructural investments for a relatively 
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large area compared to population. Thus, CAV technology finds its role in the general shift of 
the Finnish nation’s focus on being an information and knowledge economy, in contrast to its 
industrial past (Halme et al, 2014), and decoupling the prospect for economic growth from 
geographic factors. In particular, in the document “100 opportunities for Finland and the 
world”, CAVs are listed among the 100 technologies that have the potential to develop into 
world-changing technology, and the value-networks developing CAV technology are already 
considered to be among the 20 most important value-networks for Finland’s future. The 
significance of this role for CAV technology is pinpointed as arising from a specific synergy 
between innovation policy in the domains of digitalization, automation, and servitization, 
exemplified with a focus on development of artificial intelligence (AI) application, and 
increasing citizen’s digital literacy. Other significant national projects are also framed as 
supporting development of CAVs, such as development of 5G telecommunication technology 
and investments into expertise of building sensor components.  
 
In contrast to Finland’s imperative of ‘national survival’, UK and German imaginaries of the 
role of CAVs in relation to economic growth are centered on perceived existing or intended 
global leadership in technological development. From the UK, we highlight this statement from 
its Industrial Strategy:  
 
“We will become a world leader in shaping the future of mobility.” (DBEIS, 2017, p 48) 
 
A similar example about perceptions or aspirations for global technological leadership comes 
from the landing webpage of Germany’s Strategy for Automated and Connected Driving:  
 
“The motor car was invented in Germany. We have revolutionized it time and again. And 
today, we are still at the top of the international league table when it comes to innovations in 
the automotive sector. All the major innovations associated with the car - from the four-
stroke engine to the anti-lock braking system - come from Germany.” (FMTDI, 2015, no 
page) 
 
These two examples of the UK and German rhetoric exemplify important differences in the 
perceived nation’s roles in being innovation leaders. UK governance documents see emerging 
opportunities from increased digitalization and intelligence in vehicles to attract foreign 
investment and develop high-skill, well-paying, jobs. On the other hand, the German vision for 
CAV technology is firmly based on its historically important contributions to the automotive 
industry, and reflects the continuing of strong partnerships between the industry and public 
sector.  
 
Despite some similarities, there is a striking point of divergence between the UK and Germany 
in the assumed role for CAV technology. The UK policy documents highlight resilience and 
readiness of the industry, and links it to questions of national security. In the UK, an 
opportunity is perceived to use certain requirements of CAV technology to stimulate associated 
growth in the cybersecurity sector as well as to strengthen its citizens’ responses to such threats. 
This latter point contrasts with Finland’s focus on the digital literacy of citizens. The threat that 
the German industrial strategy centralizes is that of the climate crisis, and the vision of taking 
the global leading role in addressing that crisis. Finally, both UK and German governance 
documents base their arguments, for the important role to be played by investing in CAV 
technology as a key platform for economic growth, on the quality of their transportation, 
logistics, and telecommunication infrastructure. However, those arguments in the UK rhetoric 
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are focused on the need for improving the failing infrastructure, while those in Germany are 
focused on infrastructure providing an excellent basis for technological testing.  
4. Analysis: What are the domains and mechanisms of governance? 
4.1. Liability  
Assumptions about underlying risks and adverse effects shape how different governance 
cultures perceive their domains and mechanisms of action. Overall, all three governance 
approaches have an underlying premise that risks are problems to be managed, without 
recognizing potentially unanticipated consequences (see also Taeihagh and Lim 2019). One of 
the risks to be managed is the focus on liability in the case of traffic crashes, as a traditionally 
relevant question for the automotive industry. Here, it is interesting to note that the driver does 
not have a legal definition in the Finnish law, which refers to road user. Legally, the responsible 
user of the vehicle must be identifiable, but that person can legally have access to the vehicle 
via remote operation. Such cases of remote operation have been specifically included in the 
recent updates to Finnish legislation. In the UK, changes in the legislation have laid out a 
comprehensive list, clarifying the liability of insurers and CAV owners, ensuring that liability 
for accidents remains under the existing vehicle insurance scheme. In contrast, German 
legislative changes have gone one-step further, with the requirements that CAVs must have a 
black box recording during the entire journey to determine liability during collisions, and have 
doubled the maximum liability limits. 
 
4.2. Public experiments  
In addition to liability for accidents, a related domain of governance is emerging in all three 
countries – public experiments. Based on its current governance framework, Finland allows 
CAV trials on the entire road network. Several governance documents recognize the potentially 
challenging environmental conditions, such as winter and night, so encouragement of 
experimentation is seen a viable approach to managing technological risks. In addition, Finnish 
governance documents are mentioning the need for systematic classification of features for 
operational design domains (ODDs) as a response to anticipated impacts. Similarly, public 
trials in the UK have also been increasing. These trials are accompanied with the development 
of business plans and roadmaps for CAVs. In contrast with the legislation on accident liability, 
manufacturers are also protected under the Consumer Protection Act, if they demonstrate that 
vehicle was not defective at the time it was supplied, or that defect was detected only later, due 
to technological advancements. In addition, UK is the only country having recently proposed 
Code of Practice for public CAV experimentation. Thus, both Finland and UK seem to have 
opted for more experimental approach to governance, with a focus on informing and incentives 
as opposed to constraints and punishment-oriented legislation. German approach has focused 
on developing digital test beds on different road types (e.g., motorways, urban areas), for trials 
in real traffic situations. Similar to Finland and UK, this development approach has engaged 
actors from different sectors and levels, emphasizing the need for cooperation. In contrast to 
Finland and UK, German approach to testing has more explicitly been focusing on 
interoperability, exemplified with establishing a digital test bed together with France. 
 
4.3. Data management  
Hand in hand with experimentation, the question of data management in its widest sense has 
been identified as a domain in several governance documents. For example, even the Finnish 
Road Traffic Act, traditionally focused on transport legislation, has included that detailed 
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location data on roads, signs, traffic lights and other control mechanisms should be available 
for CAVs operators to use. In general, the Finnish approach has focused on deregulation, 
opening public data sources, and providing supporting digital interfaces. Transport Service 
Law has played a particularly important role in this legislative change, influenced by the 
identified synergy between CAVs and development of working business models for the 
operation of the transport system (e.g., Mobility as a Service concept). Other governance 
documents have openly acknowledged that the Finnish ecosystem is missing prototype-level 
automotive hardware computing platforms and is lagging with industry investments. Thus, 
major focus remains of data “utilization”, with assumption that “customers” will provide data 
on trip destination and origins, as this would be essential for traffic management mechanisms. 
The focus on data as synergetic with innovation incentives, domain of governance has been 
associated with financial mechanisms, such as adjustments in taxation and dedicated 
development strategies from the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation. On 
the contrary, privacy and security issues are left aside, “to be solved”, thus neglecting that data 
protection is not protection of personality, as exemplified with the quote below, from “The 
impact of automated transport on the role, operations and costs of road operators and authorities 
in Finland”:  
 
“It is assumed that for all automated vehicles the origin and destination are known, as this 
information is present in the vehicle when it commences the trip (the security and privacy 
issues have to be solved). Knowing the origin and destination is important to facilitate 
effective routing of the vehicles.” (FTCA, p 119) 
 
Slightly different from the Finnish understanding of the governance domain, the UK 
governance has explicitly focused on cybersecurity, recognizing challenges related to data theft 
and hacking. The guidelines recommend that manufacturers follow ISO standards, asking for 
personal information is “managed properly”. For example, highlighted aspects include data 
storage and transmission, as well as ensuring that CAV user is able to delete “sensitive” data, 
although more specific definitions of “proper” management or “sensitive” data are not 
provided. In addition, as mentioned in relation to the role of CAV technology, UK governance 
underlines system design for resilience to attacks and having appropriate responses under 
failure. Thus, both Finnish and UK governance cultures neglect the importance of privacy as 
the important domain for public resistance, as has already proven decisive in the case of 
proposal for reforming road-pricing regulation in Finland to enable continuous driving 
monitoring. However, it is interesting to note that a governmental attempt from 2015 in Finland 
named “A Nordic Model for Human-centered Personal Data Management and Processing”, or 
MyData in short, has fallen down in importance in the later governance documents. Developed 
as a form of data activism, MyData initiative assumed citizens and consumers being more 
active about their personal data, capable of controlling the gathering, sharing and analysis of 
personal data. Contrary to the dominant GDPR understanding, where data is considered as part 
of individual’s personality, MyData treats personal data as a resource, which the individual can 
access, control, and benefit from. Ideologically provoking, this initiative is driven by ‘parallel 
development of digital rights, innovation and business growth’, aiming to push for design of 
new services. Thus, as a form of data activism, MyData fails to address discrepancy between 
technological and social data activism (Lehtiniemi and Ruckenstein, 2019).  
 
Contrary to the Finnish and UK approach, German governance culture has taken a more 
control-oriented approach regarding data access and processing. In addition, one distinct 
feature of German governance approach is the recognition that federated structure might spur 
innovation, but that consistency would require intervention on a federal level. Thus, federal 
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cohesion is a secondary, but still an important governance mechanism. German data protection 
regulation is very similar to GDPR regarding the definition of personal data as any information 
with the slightest relation to an individual. Similar to GDPR, these regulations pertain to all 
data, and emphasize on complete transparency and drivers’ full authority over the use of such 
data. As ethics has been central value of Germans national self-understanding and self-
representation (Sperling, 2004), such emphasis is especially evident in its governance culture. 
In fact, Germany is the only EU country having formed a national Ethics Commission on 
CAVs, and provided 20 ethical guidelines for CAV development. Those guidelines are the first 
to suggest algorithms embedded in CAV technology as a necessary governance domain. For 
example, this document states that it is unethical for CAV algorithms to use any individual’s 
data (e.g., age or gender) as discriminatory decision-making criteria during unavoidable 
accident scenarios. Moreover, these guidelines are underlying data protection with the notion 
of personal autonomy and informational self-determination, as important ethical concepts, 
largely missing from Finnish and UK governance rhetoric.  
5. Analysis: Who are the governance actants? 
5.1. Non-humans 
As highlighted in the previous section, one of the clearly recognized actants is the driver, or 
the road user in Finland, which can also be a remote operator. However, all the governance 
cultures in Finland, UK, and Germany do not recognize explicitly the role and power of non-
human actants, taking a neutral stance to the meaning of technology. For example, an 
interesting change in the Finnish Road Traffic Act is replacing the continuous yellow lines on 
Finnish roads to white, as these are easier for machine vision detection. In this context, one 
could argue that technology has clearly acted on the governance actors, resulting in an unusual 
addition to the legislation that is otherwise not foreseen in such a document. Moreover, one 
can notice the importance of data as an actant, being at the center of major governance changes. 
For example, the Finnish Road Traffic Act asks for integrated detailed location data on road 
control devices, which could be used by CAV operators. Thus, the crucial point here is in 
neglecting the “missing masses”, as Latour named artefacts whose power is not accounted for 
in innovation processes (Latour, 1992). 
 
5.2. Experts 
Aside from neglecting the power of technological actants, there is a dominant focus on 
particular expert-based roles in the transport, ICT, and economic sectors, and related practices 
of foresight and technological assessment in governance processes. Despite the fact that these 
three countries are considered leaders of the democratic Western world, such focus on narrow 
expertise can be central to non-democratic technological dogmatism, reducing societal 
reflexivity and inclusive deliberation. In particular, dogmatism persists due to the lack of 
process transparency, or in case of groups unable to exercise independent views of the 
technology, often being unduly optimistic and serving the particular needs of organizations by 
which their expertise is commissioned (Collingridge, 1992). Moreover, the challenge of 
dogmatism is highlighted even more if there is a tendency for domination of the field and risk 
estimation by a handful of experts (Genus and Stirling, 2018). Altogether, such expert-based 
practices do not only lack in process ethics, but could fail to deliver a careful balance between 
equity and efficiency, failing to establish high quality processes of responsible innovation.  
 
In Finland, such tight network of human actors is spread across public, semi-public, and private 
organizations. In addition, there has been an ongoing division and restructuring of 
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organizations in the transport sector. The Ministry is still the organization responsible for 
political and strategic guidelines and legislation. However, recent changes have resulted in 
three other organizations. First, the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency, as 
responsible for transport licenses, competences, supervision, and safety. Second, the Finnish 
Transport Infrastructure Agency responsible for planning, developing, and maintaining road, 
rail, and maritime transport infrastructure, and on the coordination of transport and land-use. 
Third, the Traffic Management Finland Group, a state-owned company with a special mission 
to focus on traffic control tasks for road traffic, rail traffic, and maritime routes. In addition, 
there are also regional Centers for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment, 
and various other regional or municipal organizations, in close interaction with private sector. 
In fact, the Finnish governance documents explicitly recommend cooperation and dialogue 
between automotive industry, and national, regional, and local road operators and authorities. 
Similar networked governance roles of experts are visible in both UK and Germany. The UK 
was the first to set up a specific government department, the Centre for Connected and 
Autonomous Vehicles, followed later on by Germany with national platform “Future of 
Mobility”, where one out of six working groups is “Digitization, Automated Driving and New 
Mobility Concepts”. In addition, in all three countries, it is evident that assumed roles needed 
for governance of CAVs are not just in transport or ICT sector, but also in the economic sector, 
such as Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy in the UK. However, the UK 
governance network was noticeably more focused on including security experts, such as those 
from the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and National Cybersecurity 
Centre. 
 
5.3. Wider public 
Following the concept of citoyen1 from the European tradition of French revolution, it is 
important to highlight that such a conception of an individual cannot be found in the existing 
governance imaginaries. In fact, word such as customer, consumer or user are more often used 
than the word citizen. The relation to such imagined “customer” is establishing a mediating or 
subordinate relation over citoyens. Several documents focus on a need to steer behavior 
towards consistency and predictability, arguing for familiarizing users with the rules. In 
addition, such “customer” is only expected to ask for more functional service, but not for such 
aspects as social justice, exemplified with a quote below, from “The impact of automated 
transport on the role, operations and costs of road operators and authorities in Finland”: 
 
“The customer most likely wants a vehicle that can manage a large part of the journey by 
itself so that the vehicle occupants can utilise the travel to other uses than driving.” (FTCA, 
p.124) 
 
Surprisingly, despite the societal value of equality and legacy of social democracy, Finnish 
approach emphasizes that public sector organizations have to “show the public that they are 
actively involved in the development”, which is supposed to increase trust and willingness to 
use new technologies, minimizing time for uptake. The recommendations continue with even 
suggesting joint communication campaigns with the industrial partners. Similarly, even 
German ethics commission does not take a usual stance as with some previous emerging 
technologies of accounting for citoyens in the governance network (Burri, 2015). Although 
social movements have historically played an important role in shaping discourses of 
technological innovation in Germany, the hypothetical individual of the ethical guidelines still 
                                                 
1 Envisioned as a citizen highly active in exercising her civil rights, while sharing the values of liberté, égalité, 
and fraternité, contrasted to the narrow interpretation of citizen in contemporary nation states.   
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relies on intervention of the state for ensuring her own personal autonomy. Altogether, 
governance roles for citizens are not envisioned as the one of equal partner in steering 
technological futures, but only as an actor that can potentially resist new technology. 
Consequently, in the German governance culture, issues of legitimacy and trust have to be 
tackled through linear information exchange or digital education initiatives.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
6.1. Summary discussion of findings 
This research has analyzed the country-specific approaches to the governance of CAVs in 
Finland, Germany and the UK. In order to do so, policies for the automation of mobility have 
been reviewed in the light of the sociotechnical imaginaries and governance cultures. First, we 
compare assumed roles of CAV technology in three societies, second we relate governance 
efforts to representations of benefits and risks, and thirdly, we expose the assumed roles of 
responsible governance actors, including assumptions of state-society relations. The starting 
point for analysis is that sociotechnical imaginaries are simultaneously being enacted, 
constructed and reconstructed, each of which shape the form of political action. Returning to 
Collingridge’s dilemma for responsible innovation, we argue that the process of developing 
innovation governance is showing initial signs of reflection on unanticipated and undesired 
consequences, beyond the initial focal points, such as traffic safety and digital security.  
 
The analysis of CAVs roles in all three countries highlights a strong relation to national 
economic growth, although with some differences in reasoning. While such economic growth 
for Finland might be a matter of long-term societal survival, UK and Germany are struggling 
to maintain a global image as leaders, while reconciling some additional values, such as 
security or environmental justice. Such aspects of national identity play a major role in shaping 
the assumptions about the role of CAV in the future. In understanding the governance relation 
to technological risks, all three countries focus on risk management approach, underlying that 
innovation requires both infrastructure and enabling regulation. In addition to the traditional 
transport governance domain of liability in case of accidents, all three countries are developing 
strategies for emerging domains of data and public experimentation. However, Germany has 
distinguished itself with the first set of ethical guidelines for CAV development, specifically 
including algorithms as the necessary domain of governance.  
 
Despite this effort, no country recognizes the need for expanding the governance actant 
network to include citoyens as active entities in exercising their civil rights. On the contrary, 
the dominant framing of issues in relation to the constitution of expertise and the dissemination 
of knowledge leads to a re-stabilized notion of normativity through which technology is 
supposed to engage with other social institutions. The key findings that distinguish the three 
approaches are summarized in Table 4. Contrasting imaginaries do not mark rigid 
characteristics of the respective Finnish, UK or German political cultures. However, probing 
the tacit assumptions underlying governance documents through sociotechnical imaginaries 
has highlighted crucial aspects of CAV governance, discerning some distinct elements of how 







Table 4: Summary of key findings from Finland, Germany and the UK according to the key research 
questions 
 
 Finland United Kingdom Germany 
1. Roles of CAV 
technology in society 
• Finding a global 
market niche 
• Digital society and 
knowledge economy 
agenda 
• Industry resilience 
and competitiveness  
• National security 
• Automotive 
leadership role  
• Climate action 
2. Domains and 
mechanisms of 
governance 
• Extensive public 
experimentation  
• Data utilization and 
transport services 
development  
• AI and digital 
literacy 






• Digital infrastructure 




• Personal data 
privacy and 
algorithms 
• Federal cohesion 
3. Governance actants 
in CAV development 
• Artefacts decoupled 
from accountability 




• Citizens as rule-
following consumers 
• Artefacts decoupled 
from accountability 





• Citizens as resilient 
users  
• Artefacts decoupled 
from accountability 









6.2. The treat of technological determinism for responsible innovation 
Coming back to the initial point about fundamental governance rationales of efficiency, equity 
and ethics when faced with Collingridge’s dilemma, the analysis points out an important set of 
questions for responsible innovation processes. The analysis points that expectations of 
benefits over risks are highly weighted, bringing about asymmetry between hopes in future 
applications, hiding dissonance and conflict over desired futures. Thus, at the core of 
governance challenge is the understanding that technology is not a neutral and default-positive 
actant, and that technological development is irreducibly a political and value-driven choice 
rather than an instrumental facilitation of what is an inevitable (automated) future. In more 
details, the analysis indicates a threat of three different types of technological determinism, 
namely justificatory, methodological, and normative – which could be leading to potential 
technological myopia and somnambulism (Winner, 2014). Each of these types of technological 
determinism bring about a challenge for transparency, accountability, and responsiveness 
mechanisms in technological governance processes.  
 
The above-identified aspects of national identities play a major role in shaping the assumed 
role of CAV technology in society, potentially leading to a version of justificatory 
technological determinism and techno-optimism. Justificatory determinism argument focuses 
on the point that specific technological change is necessary to achieve unquestionable benefits 
(Wyatt, 2008). Here, framing CAV technology through the lens of international competition is 
an important aspect that could have at least two challenges for responsiveness. First, as already 
highlighted by Collingridge, competition can actually serve to restrict the number of 
alternatives. Instead of sharpening reflexivity, a particular version of technology can become 
intrinsically embedded in the imaginaries, with the focus being on minimizing time to 
deployment as opposed to exploring alternatives. Second, responsiveness can be inhibited by 
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potential fear from diseconomies of scale, increasing the cost per unit due to capital 
intensiveness and dependence on large-scale infrastructure, if decisions are subsequently found 
to be mistaken. Similarly, the investment in digital infrastructural layers is considered as an 
important factor as a potential challenge for automation. Thus, due to inherent uncertainty 
about future costs while under potential threat for increased cost, decision-making might prefer 
low sunk costs associated with incremental improvements of existing technological 
infrastructures as opposed to more different technological alternatives.  
 
The findings indicate that all three governance approaches have an underlying premise that 
risks are problems to be managed, without recognizing potentially unanticipated consequences 
(see also Taeihagh and Lim 2019). With such an approach, there is a potential threat of a second 
version of techno-determinism – methodological, which renders technology opaque, 
simplified, and with transferred assumptions from earlier technologies without questioning 
them (Wyatt, 2008). Such an example regarding CAV technology is transference of 
assumptions built into existing urban traffic control technology since the 19th century 
(Mladenovic et al., 2016). These unquestioned but transferred assumptions neglect the fact that 
technology is another actant in the web of responsibility, and not inanimate object, upon which 
human subjects act. The crucial stance here is not just in neglecting the “missing masses”, as 
Latour named artefacts whose power is not accounted for in innovation processes (Latour, 
1992). In fact, the crucial aspect is in consequent decoupling of technology from political 
accountability and intervention, which can be interpreted as a third category of technological 
determinism – normative (Wyatt, 2008).  
 
From the findings, we can conclude that technological development is not based on the 
democratic enhancement of dialogue between state and society. Perhaps, an expectation might 
be that citoyens are lacking skills and knowledge to deliberate about advantages and 
disadvantages of this emerging technology. Thus, ideological zeitgeists of these three 
democratic societies in relation to CAV technology do not aspire to the very democratic ideals 
constituting their legal and moral foundations. Framing citizens as well-informed and willing 
consumers raises the question of potential loss of the notion of the commons in transport 
provision, if CAV development is largely intertwined with a commercialized overhaul of 
mobility markets. As previously identified by (Noy and Givoni, 2018; Lyons, 2018), there 
might also be a misunderstanding of relation between commercial and sustainability 
considerations related to technological development. In fact, European innovation processes 
could be overwhelmed by a large-scale commodification of the mobility commons, potentially 
erasing an important dividing line for moral limits of mobility markets. The resulting 
corruption of the nature of the transport good itself, and further transfer of existing monetary 
inequalities, as argued in general by (Sandel, 2012), could further push large groups of people 
to the position of subordinate dependents.  
 
6.3. Further research and development needs 
The use of technology studies concepts can help in opening new pathways for 
reconceptualizing CAV technology and associated governance processes. For example, 
reconceptualization of emerging automated mobility technologies will need to critically reflect 
on the ways CAV technology mediates human practices, experiences, and value frameworks 
(Mladenovic et al., 2019), or through heteromation, pointed out by (Ekbia and Nardi, 2017), as 
capital accumulation from extracting value through low-cost or free human labor redistributed 
in computer-mediated networks. In addition, further research should pay closer attention to 
trajectories of technological imaginaries across cultures and various segments of society, as 
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they transform through heterogeneous cultural perceptions, experiences and identities. A 
particular focus should be paid to histories of success and failure in technological innovation, 
and their influence on shaping national identities and emotional relations to technological 
artefacts. Further analysis of the Finnish governance trajectory, as a society with reduced social 
hierarchy, could be enlightening new conceptualizations for collaboration in technological 
innovation processes.  
 
As already recognized by Collingridge, governance of technological innovation is 
fundamentally about ‘muddling through’ in the context of incumbent powers and vested 
interests. Similarly, current CAV technological development processes are largely 
depoliticized. If they are to be repoliticised, issues of interorganizational learning practices will 
be more challenging. Further studies of policy design should pay attention to dissonances 
between governance perspectives on the national, supranational, and subnational level. In 
particular, future studies should pay more attention to patenting regulation and regulatory 
structures for establishing ownership models that could balance monopolistic technological 
development processes. Moreover, transport studies can learn from the ongoing discussion in 
the domain of AI regulation, where strong levels of quality control are encouraged through 
robust data-sharing agreements, access rights for different stakeholders, and audits (Johal and 
Urban, 2017; Kerber and Frank, 2017; Cath et al., 2018). Some aspects of data collection, 
storage, sharing, ownership, liability, and pricing related to CAVs have already been identified 
(Brown et al., 2018). In the European context, the starting point for developing potential 
responses is the existing General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) law on data protection 
and privacy. Further development of innovation indicators and public access to those would 
help in avoiding “gold plating” certain technological alternatives through financial subsidies 
or taxation allowances, in line with Collingridge’s approach of incrementalism being more 
appropriate for generating and preserving technological alternatives in order to avoid 
unanticipated consequences arising once path dependence is too firmly established. 
 
Finally, there is an urgent need to develop experimentation processes used for different stages 
and by different responsible actors, while reformulating procedures for openly collaborative 
technological development. In particular, it is necessary to have wider societal inclusion and 
empowerment of the missing ‘outsiders’ (Van de Poel, 2000), as has already been identified 
before (Blyth, et al., 2016; Cohen et al., 2018; Mladenovic, 2019). More useful frameworks for 
enabling the practice of critical citizen engagement and participatory deliberation will be an 
essential component of such development (Flipse and Puylaert, 2018; Macnaghten and 
Chilvers, 2014; Mladenovic and McPherson, 2016; Mladenovic, 2019). In developing such 
frameworks, we should not aim for creating artificial consensus over technological alternatives, 
but in exploring dissensus and perhaps inevitable conflict of societal values designed into CAV 
data structures and algorithms (Genus, 2006; Mladenovic, 2019). In this strand of research, 
understanding how to reinforce accountabilities will inevitably lead to a larger question of how 
to govern by strengthening democracy itself. If these much-needed efforts are not taken 
seriously and technological development processes fail to reinforce accountability, we will 
potentially create conditions not just for loss of trust in technology or associated governing 









This research is dedicated to the memory of Moshe Givoni, a very dear friend and colleague 
who helped to develop the initial idea for this research during his sabbatical at Aalto University. 
Sadly, Moshe passed away before it was finalized. This research received partial support from 
WISE-ACT COST Action (No. 16222), as well as from the FINEST Twins Centre of 
Excellence. A version of this manuscript has been previously published in the Advances in 
Transport Policy and Planning.  
 
8. References 
Berkhout, F., 2006. Normative expectations in systems innovation. Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management, 18(3-4), pp.299-311. 
Brown, A., Rodriguez, G., Best, B., Hoang, K.T., Safford, H., Anderson, G. and D’Agostino, 
M.C., 2018. Federal, State, and Local Governance of Automated Vehicles. Institute of 
Transportation Studies & Policy Institute for Energy, Environment and the Economy, 
University of California Davis 
Blyth, P.L., Mladenovic, M.N., Nardi, B.A., Ekbia, H.R. and Su, N.M., 2016. Expanding the 
design horizon for self-driving vehicles: Distributing benefits and burdens. IEEE Technology 
and Society Magazine, 35(3), pp.44-49. 
Burri, R.V., 2015. Imaginaries of science and society: framing nanotechnology governance in 
Germany and the United States. Dreamscapes of modernity: sociotechnical imaginaries and the 
fabrication of power. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp.233-253. 
Cath, C., Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L., 2018. Artificial intelligence 
and the ‘good society’: the US, EU, and UK approach. Science and engineering ethics, 24(2), 
pp.505-528. 
Cohen, T. and Cavoli, C., 2019. ‘Automated vehicles: exploring possible consequences of 
government (non)intervention for congestion and accessibility’, Transport Reviews, 39 (1), 
129–51. 
Cohen, T., Stilgoe, J. and Cavoli, C., 2018. Reframing the governance of automotive 
automation: insights from UK stakeholder workshops. Journal of Responsible Innovation, 5(3), 
pp.257-279. 
Collingridge, David. 1980. The Social Control of Technology. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
Collingridge, D., 1992. The management of scale: Big organizations, big decisions, big 
mistakes. Routledge. 
Ekbia, H.R. and Nardi, B.A., 2017. Heteromation, and other stories of computing and 
capitalism. MIT Press. 
Fagnant, D.J. and Kockelman, K., 2015. Preparing a nation for autonomous vehicles: 
opportunities, barriers and policy recommendations. Transportation Research Part A: Policy 
and Practice, 77, pp.167-181. 
Faisal, A., Yigitcanlar, T., Kamruzzaman, M., & Currie, G. 2019. Understanding autonomous 
vehicles: A systematic literature review on capability, impact, planning and policy. Journal of 
Transport and Land Use, 12(1), 45-72. 
Feenberg, A., 1999. Questioning technology. London, Routledge. 
Felt, U., Fouché, R., Miller, C.A. and Smith-Doerr, L. eds., 2017. The handbook of science and 
technology studies. MIT Press. 
Flipse, S.M. and Puylaert, S., 2018. Organizing a Collaborative Development of Technological 
Design Requirements Using a Constructive Dialogue on Value Profiles: A Case in Automated 
Vehicle Development. Science and engineering ethics, 24(1), pp.49-72. 
 
17 
Fraedrich, E., Heinrichs, D., Bahamonde-Birke, F. J., & Cyganski, R. 2019. Autonomous 
driving, the built environment and policy implications. Transportation research part A: policy 
and practice, 122, 162-172. 
Genus, A., 2006. Rethinking constructive technology assessment as democratic, reflective, 
discourse. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 73(1), pp.13-26. 
Genus, A. and Stirling, A., 2018. Collingridge and the dilemma of control: Towards responsible 
and accountable innovation. Research policy, 47(1), pp.61-69. 
Guerra, E. (2016). Planning for cars that drive themselves: Metropolitan planning 
organizations, regional transportation plans, and autonomous vehicles. Journal of Planning 
Education and Research, 36(2), 210-224. 
Halme, K., Lindy, I., Piirainen, K.A., Salminen, V., White, J., 2014. Finland as a knowledge 
economy 2.0: lessons on policies and governance. Washington, DC. 
https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0194-5. 
Hopkins, D. and Schwanen, T., 2018. Governing the race to automation. In Governance of the 
smart mobility transition (pp. 65-84). Emerald Publishing Limited. 
Howlett, M. (2009). Governance modes, policy regimes and operational plans: A multi-level 
nested model of policy instrument choice and policy design. Policy Sciences 42(1) 73-89. 
Jasanoff, S. ed., 2004. States of knowledge: the co-production of science and the social order. 
Routledge. 
Jasanoff, S. and Kim, S.H. eds., 2015. Dreamscapes of modernity: Sociotechnical imaginaries 
and the fabrication of power. University of Chicago Press. 
Johal, S. and Urban, M.C., 2017. Regulating Disruption. Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation, 
University of Toronto. 
Kaplan, S. and Tripsas, M., 2008. Thinking about technology: Applying a cognitive lens to 
technical change. Research Policy, 37(5), pp.790-805. 
Kerber, W. and Frank, J., 2017. Data Governance Regimes in the Digital Economy: The 
Example of Connected Cars. Available at SSRN 3064794. 
Kroes, P. and Verbeek, P.P. eds., 2014. The moral status of technical artefacts (Vol. 17). 
Springer Science & Business Media. 
Kudina, O., 2019. The technological mediation of morality: value dynamism, and the complex 
interaction between ethics and technology. Delft University of Technology 
Latour, B. 1992. Where are the missing masses? The sociology of a few mundane artefacts. In 
W. Bijker & J. Law (Eds.), Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Socio-Technical 
Change (pp. 225–258). Cambridge, Massachusetss: The MIT press. 
Latour, B., 1996. On actor-network theory: A few clarifications. Soziale welt, pp.369-381. 
Legacy, C., D. Ashmore, J. Scheurer, J. Stone and Curtis, C., 2019. ‘Planning the driverless 
city’, Transport Reviews, 39 (1), 84–102. 
Lehtiniemi, T. and Ruckenstein, M., 2019. The social imaginaries of data activism. Big Data 
& Society, 6(1), p.1-12. 
Loughlin, J., F. Hendriks, and A. Lidström, eds. 2011. Oxford Handbook of Local and Regional 
Democracy in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lyons, G., 2018. Getting smart about urban mobility–aligning the paradigms of smart and 
sustainable. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 115, pp.4-14. 
Macnaghten, P. and Chilvers, J., 2014. The future of science governance: publics, policies, 
practices. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 32(3), pp.530-548. 
Marsden, G. and Reardon, L., 2017. Questions of governance: Rethinking the study of 
transportation policy. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 101, pp.238-251. 
Milakis, D. 2019. ‘Long-term implications of automated vehicles: an introduction’, Transport 
Reviews, 39 (1), 1–8. 
 
18 
Milakis, D., Van Arem, B. and Van Wee, B., 2017. Policy and society related implications of 
automated driving: A review of literature and directions for future research. Journal of 
Intelligent Transportation Systems, 21(4), pp.324-348. 
Mladenović, M.N., 2018. Embracing the Complexity and Justice of Mobilities Automation?. 
Blogged Environment 
Mladenović, M.N., 2019. How Should We Drive Self-driving Vehicles? Anticipation and 
Collective Imagination in Planning Mobility Futures. In The Governance of Smart 
Transportation Systems (pp. 103-122). Springer, Cham. 
Mladenovic, M.N. and McPherson, T., 2016. Engineering social justice into traffic control for 
self-driving vehicles?. Science and engineering ethics, 22(4), pp.1131-1149. 
Mladenovic, M.N., Abbas, M.M., Blyth, P.L. and Kosonen, I., 2016, October. Intersecting our 
mobilities: path dependence from manually-operated semaphore to self-driving vehicles?. In 
2016 IEEE International Symposium on Technology and Society (ISTAS) (pp. 1-6). IEEE. 
Mladenovic, M.N., Lehtinen, S., Soh, E., Martens, K., 2019. Emerging urban mobility 
technologies through the lens of everyday urban aesthetics: Case of self-driving vehicle. Essays 
in Philosophy. 21 (2) 
Noorman, M., 2014. Responsibility practices and unmanned military technologies. Science and 
engineering ethics, 20(3), pp.809-826. 
Noy, K. and Givoni, M., 2018. Is ‘smart mobility’ sustainable? Examining the views and 
beliefs of transport’s technological entrepreneurs. Sustainability, 10(2), p.422. 
Pangbourne, K., 2010. The Changing Geography of Scottish Transport Governance. PhD 
Thesis, University of Aberdeen 
Pangbourne, K., Mladenović, M.N., Stead, D. and Milakis, D., 2020. Questioning mobility as 
a service: Unanticipated implications for society and governance. Transportation research part 
A: policy and practice, 131, pp.35-49. 
Paulsson, A., Hylander, J. and Hrelja, R., 2017. One for all, or all for oneself? Governance 
cultures in regional public transport planning. European Planning Studies, 25(12), pp.2293-
2308. 
Pinch, T.J. and Bijker, W.E., 1984. The social construction of facts and artefacts: Or how the 
sociology of science and the sociology of technology might benefit each other. Social studies 
of science, 14(3), pp.399-441. 
Porter, L., Stone, J., Legacy, C., Curtis, C., Harris, J., Fishman, E., Kent, J., Marsden, G., 
Reardon, L. and Stilgoe, J., 2018. The Autonomous Vehicle Revolution: Implications for 
Planning/The Driverless City?/Autonomous Vehicles–A Planner’s Response/Autonomous 
Vehicles: Opportunities, Challenges and the Need for Government Action/Three Signs 
Autonomous Vehicles Will Not Lead to Less Car Ownership and Less Car Use in Car 
Dependent Cities–A Case Study of Sydney, Australia/Planning for Autonomous Vehicles? 
Questions of Purpose, Place and Pace/Ensuring Good Governance: The Role of Planners in the 
Development of Autonomous Vehicles .... Planning Theory & Practice, 19(5), pp.753-778. 
Rogge, K.S. and Reichardt, K., 2016. Policy mixes for sustainability transitions: An extended 
concept and framework for analysis. Research Policy, 45(8), pp.1620-1635. 
Rotolo, D., Hicks, D. and Martin, B.R., 2015. What is an emerging technology?. Research 
Policy, 44(10), pp.1827-1843. 
Ryghaug, M. and Toftaker, M., 2016. Creating transitions to electric road transport in Norway: 
The role of user imaginaries. Energy Research & Social Science, 17, pp.119-126. 
Sandel, M.J., 2012. What money can't buy: the moral limits of markets. Macmillan. 
Schulzke, M., 2013. Autonomous weapons and distributed responsibility. Philosophy & 
Technology, 26(2), pp.203-219.  
Sclove, R., 1995. Democracy and technology. Guilford Press. 
 
19 
Sperling, S., 2004. Managing potential selves: stem cells, immigrants, and German identity. 
Science and Public Policy, 31(2), pp.139-149. 
Stead, D., 2018. Policy preferences and the diversity of instrument choice for mitigating 
climate change impacts in the transport sector. Journal of Environmental Planning and 
Management, 61(14), pp.2445-2467. 
Stilgoe, J., 2018. Machine learning, social learning and the governance of self-driving cars. 
Social studies of science, 48(1), pp.25-56. 
Sturken, M., Thomas, D. and Ball-Rokeach, S. eds., 2004. Technological visions: The hopes 
and fears that shape new technologies. Temple University Press. 
Susskind, J., 2018. Future politics: Living together in a world transformed by tech. Oxford 
University Press. 
Taeihagh, A. and Lim, H.S.M., 2019. Governing autonomous vehicles: emerging responses for 
safety, liability, privacy, cybersecurity, and industry risks. Transport reviews, 39(1), pp.103-
128. 
Thomopoulos, N., & Givoni, M. (2015). The autonomous car—a blessing or a curse for the 
future of low carbon mobility? An exploration of likely vs. desirable outcomes. European 
Journal of Futures Research, 3(1), 14. 
Van de Poel, I. (2011). The Relation Between Forward-Looking and Backward-Looking 
Responsibility. In N. A. Vincent, I. van de Poel, J. van den Hoven (Eds.), Moral Responsibility: 
Beyond free will and determinism. the Netherlands: Springer, 37–52. 
Verbeek, P.P., 2011. Moralizing technology: Understanding and designing the morality of 
things. University of Chicago Press. 
Voß, J.P. and Freeman, R. eds., 2016. Knowing governance: the epistemic construction of 
political order. Springer. 
Van De Poel, I., 2000. On the role of outsiders in technical development. Technology Analysis 
& Strategic Management, 12(3), pp.383-397. 
Wetmore, J.M., 2004. Redefining risks and redistributing responsibilities: Building networks 
to increase automobile safety. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 29(3), pp.377-405. 
Winfield, A.F. and Jirotka, M., 2018. Ethical governance is essential to building trust in 
robotics and artificial intelligence systems. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: 
Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, 376(2133), p.20180085. 
Winner, L., 1980. Do artifacts have politics?. Daedalus, pp.121-136. 
Winner, L., 2014. Technologies as forms of life. In Ethics and emerging technologies (pp. 48-
60). Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Wyatt, S., 2008. Technological determinism is dead; Long live technological determinism. In 
Handbook of science and technology studies (pp. 165-180). MIT press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
